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We analyze the net tax advantage of S corporations relative to C corporations. Our analysis indicates that the net tax advantage is economically important; it varies directly with the company's payout ratio, the marginal corporate tax rate, and the capital gains rate of the marginal investor; and it varies inversely with the personal tax rate of the marginal investor. The analysis predicts that the fair market value of a S corporation will exceed that of an otherwise identical C corporation. This prediction holds even in the case of an acquisition of a S corporation. Consistent with our predictions, we find that publicly traded master limited partnerships, which enjoy net tax advantages in the early 1980s, are valued at a premium relative to taxable corporations operating in the same industry. [JEL CODES: ?]
S corporation status was created by Congress in 1958 as part of a program to offer tax incentives for small business growth. Prior to 1996, S corporations were limited to a maximum of 35 shareholders, could have only one class of common stock, and could have no foreign or corporate shareholders. Beginning in 1996, the maximum number of shareholders was increased to 75, and the set of eligible shareholders was expanded to include some trusts, some tax-exempt organizations, and some banks. 1 S corporations are pass-through entities in which the corporation's entire taxable income is passed through to shareholders before being taxed at the personal level. In effect, the corporation is treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes. Shareholders pay tax on the corporation's entire income regardless of whether that income is distributed to shareholders in the form of a dividend or share repurchase. By contrast, C corporations (commonly referred to as regular corporations) first pay tax at the corporate level on the corporation's entire income. Subsequently, shareholders are taxed at the personal level on any cash distribution or realization of capital gains.
The valuation of S corporations poses some unique challenges. Because of the restrictions on share ownership, S corporations are generally not publicly traded firms. To value a private entity, a common approach is to use publicly traded C corporations as a benchmark, then apply some adjustments for features such as the lack of marketability, the presence of controlling shareholders, and differential taxation. In the case of S corporations, the nature of the adjustment for differential taxation is controversial. Some argue that the value of the S corporation should reflect the value that a C corporation would be willing to pay in an acquisition. Under this argument, therefore, the income of the S corporation is first adjusted as if it is taxable at the corporate level, then a valuation ratio of a C corporation is applied to this adjusted income. Others argue that this approach is flawed, because it ignores the benefits of the S corporation's differential tax status. Proponents of this approach argue that S corporations should be valued at a premium relative to C corporations. However, it is unclear what the magnitude of this premium should be. Practitioners tend to employ a variety of ad hoc techniques and typically ignore the possibility that different circumstances might warrant different valuation differentials between S corporations and C corporations.
In this article, we inform this debate by clarifying the value of differences in tax status between S corporations and C corporations. First, we show that S corporations enjoy a tax advantage over C corporations under the Second, using a simple discounted cash flow model, we document valuation differences between S corporations and C corporations using current top marginal tax rates for corporations and individuals. These valuation differences depend on the firm's payout ratio, the marginal tax rate on corporate income, and the marginal tax rate on personal income. Under current statutory rates, we show that a S corporation will generally be valued at a premium over an identical C corporation. This premium is as large as 54%.
Third, we report empirical evidence on the difference in valuation ratios between master limited partnerships (MLPs) and comparable C corporations. MLPs are partnerships in which the general partners are organized as a corporation in order to provide limited liability. Because some of these corporations were publicly traded in the early 1980s, they offer a rare opportunity to compare the valuation ratios of publicly traded pass-through entitities with similar taxable entities. Consistent with the valuation differences predicted by our simulations, our evidence indicates that MLPs are valued at a premium as large as 43% relative to comparable taxable corporations.
Finally, we consider the special case of acquisitions of S corporations by C corporations. We show that tax factors cause the S corporation to be more valuable in an acquisition than an otherwise identical C corporation if the acquisition is structured as a taxable acquisition or if the acquirer is purchasing a minority interest in the S corporation. If the acquisition is structured as a tax-free corporate acquisition, then the S corporation has the same value to the acquirer as an otherwise identical C corporation. However, even in this case, we argue that the market value of the S corporation will be higher than that of the comparable C corporation, because the S corporation shareholders would never sell their shares to the acquirer for less than what they would be worth if the company were to remain independent.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I quantifies the tax differences between S corporations and C corporations under various tax regimes. Section II employs a simple valuation model to simulate differences in value and valuation ratios between S corporations and C corporations. Section III reports our empirical evidence on the difference in valuation ratios between MLPs and comparable taxable corporations. Section IV discusses the acquisition of S corporations by C corporations. Section V concludes with a summary of our findings and their implications for practitioners.
I. Tax Differences Between S Corporations and C Corporations
To illustrate the difference in tax obligations between S corporations and C corporations, consider two corporations that are identical in every respect except for their tax status.
2 One corporation is a S corporation in which all income is passed through to shareholders and taxed at the shareholder's marginal tax rate on personal income t p . The other corporation is a regular corporation in which corporate income is taxed at the marginal corporate rate t c , dividends paid to shareholders are taxed at the marginal personal rate t p , and capital gains are taxed at the marginal capital gains rate t g . Because capital gains are taxed only when realized, t g should be viewed as the present value of the shareholder's tax obligation per dollar of capital gain. Each corporation is financed entirely by equity capital, has earnings before tax equal to EBT, and retains RE of its after-corporate-tax profits.
Under these assumptions, the combined corporate and personal taxes paid by a C corporation, T c , will be equal to the following:
By contrast, since all income is passed through to the shareholders of a S corporation, the taxes of a S corporation, T s , will be equal to:
Thus, the difference in taxes paid by C corporations and S corporations is given by:
Equation (3) implies that the difference in taxes paid by shareholders of C corporations and S corporations depends on the relative magnitudes of the marginal corporate and personal tax rates and on the corporation's payout ratio. To see this consider the following three cases.
Case 1: 100% Payout Ratio
If RE = 0, Equation (1) reduces to T c = t c EBT + t s EBT(1-t c ).
Thus, the difference in taxes paid between C corporations and S corporations becomes:
Equation (4) shows that, if all earnings are paid out as dividends, a S corporation will enjoy a net tax advantage over an identical C corporation as long as marginal tax rates are positive. The reason for this is clear. If all earnings are paid as dividends, the earnings of the C corporation are first taxed at the corporate level, then taxed again at the shareholders personal rate. The earnings of the S corporation are only taxed at the marginal personal rate.
Case 2: RE = EBT(1-t c )
The more interesting case occurs when the corporation elects to retain earnings. If earnings are not paid out as dividends, they are not taxed at the personal level until the shareholder realizes capital gains income. Thus, personal taxes on the C corporation's net income are deferred, whereas all of the S corporation's earnings are taxed at the shareholder's marginal personal rate. To see the net effect on total taxes paid, assume that each corporation retains an amount equal to the net income of the C corporation (i.e., RE = EBT (1-t c )). In this case:
From Equation (5), T c -T s > 0 if t c > (t p -t g )/(1-t g ). In other words, the net tax advantage of S corporations will be increasing in t c and t g and decreasing in t p . Intuitively, the tax deferral option of capital gains in C corporations becomes more valuable if the marginal rate on personal income is large relative to the marginal rate on capital gains income and corporate income.
Case 3: 0 < RE < EBT(1-t c )
More generally, if we rearrange Equation (3), it can be shown that S corporations enjoy a net tax advantage under the following conditions.
Equation (6) illustrates that the net tax advantage of S corporations depends not only on the relative magnitudes of the marginal corporate and personal tax rates, but also on the company's payout ratio. The lower the fraction of earnings retained by the corporation, the greater the net tax advantage (if any) of the S corporation.
Exhibit 1 reports the net tax difference between C corporations and S corporations under different tax regimes and different payout policies. We use the different statutory rates adopted by the US Congress over the past 20 years as reported in Scholes et al. (2001) . We also allow the company's retained earnings to take on one of three values: RE = 0, RE= 0.5(EBT), or RE = EBT (1-t c ).
As reported in Exhibit 1, the net tax difference between C corporations and S corporations has been positive since 1982, when Congress lowered the top marginal tax rate on personal income from 70% to 50%. Under the current tax code in which the marginal tax rates are 35% on corporate income, 39.6% on personal income, and 20% on capital gains, the net tax savings per dollar of earnings for S corporations is $0.21 for a company that pays out all of its earnings as dividends, $0.11 for a company that pays out half of its earnings as dividends, and $0.08 for companies retaining all earnings.
Of course, one might argue that the statutory rate of 20% on capital gains income overstates the true marginal tax rate. As noted earlier, capital gains are taxed only when these gains are realized by investors. Moreover, investors have the option to time the realization of gains for periods in which they have offsetting capital losses. This tax timing option effectively lowers the marginal tax rate on capital gains income below the 20% statutory rate. In theory, investors could postpone capital gains taxes indefinitely.
To see the impact of this tax timing option, the last row of Exhibit 1 computes tax differentials between C corporations and S corporations under the extreme assumption that the effective tax rate on capital gains income is zero. Under this assumption, the net tax advantage of S corporations is reduced if the company retains some of its earnings. In fact, if the company retains all of its earnings, there is a net tax advantage to C corporations of $0.05 per dollar of EBT. The reason for this is clear. If the marginal corporate tax rate is less than the marginal personal rate, the C corporation form is advantageous if its investors never pay personal tax on the capital gains income. This is, of course, an extreme assumption. Our analysis (not reported in the Exhibit) indicates that as long as the marginal capital gains rate is larger than 6.5%, there is a net tax advantage to S corporation status.
II. Valuation Differences Between S Corporations and C Corporations
In the previous section, we show that under the current US Tax Code, a S corporation enjoys a net tax 
Exhibit 1. PLEASE ADD A TITLE HERE
This exhibit displays the differences between net taxes paid by C corporations and S corporations. Conditional on the statutory tax rates for corporate and personal income in different time periods, the Exhibit reports the difference in net taxes per dollar of pretax earnings (EBT) paid by a C corporation and an otherwise identical S corporation.
advantage over an otherwise identical C corporation. As long as the corporation is expected to retain its pass-through status, investors should value the S corporation at a premium over the otherwise identical C corporation. In this section, we employ a simple discounted cash flow model to illustrate how these tax differentials translate into differences in company value. We again assume that each company is an all-equity firm that will have earnings before tax of EBT in the coming year. For simplicity, we assume that these earnings will grow at an annual rate of g into perpetuity. Each company retains an identical amount of its earnings equal to (1-d)(1-t c )EBT each year and invests this amount back into its primary businesses. Because the companies are identical in every respect except tax status, shareholders require the same after-tax required return r e on an investment in the company's shares.
The market value of the firm can be represented as the present value of the after-tax dividends received by shareholders. Consider first the value of the C corporation. In each period, the cash flow received by shareholders will be equal to the difference between after-tax earnings and earnings retained by the corporation. Then, this cash flow is taxed at the shareholder's marginal personal tax rate to yield an after-tax cash flow CF c equal to:
If EBT grows at the constant rate g and the company maintains a constant payout policy, the value of the C corporation V c is then given by:
Shareholders of a S corporation will receive dividends equal to the difference between EBT and earnings retained by the corporation. However, they will pay personal tax on the entire EBT. Thus, the aftertax cash flows to the shareholders of a S corporation CF s will be:
Again, if we assume constant growth in EBT and a constant payout policy, the value of the S corporation V s is given by:
The difference in value between a S corporation and an otherwise identical C corporation DV is given by the difference between Equations (10) and (8).
Equation (11) has the following interpretation. The difference in value between S corporations and C corporations is equal to the difference between the taxes paid by the corporation and the tax that S corporation shareholders pay on earnings retained by the corporation. These earnings are sheltered from personal taxation in the C corporation.
3 Thus, the difference in value between S corporations and C corporations will be increasing in the corporate tax rate and in the dividend payout, but decreasing in the marginal personal tax rate.
As noted earlier, S corporations are typically valued by using the value of C corporations as a benchmark, then applying an adjustment. Consequently, it is useful to represent the difference in value between S corporations and C corporations as a percentage of the value of the C corporation.
In Exhibit 2, we quantify Equation (12) under different tax regimes and different payout policies. Specifically, we allow the corporate tax rate to range from the top rate over the past two decades, 46%, to the current marginal rate of 35%; the marginal personal rate ranges from its value in 1982, 50%, to the lowest rate over the past two decades, 28%; the company's payout rate, d, ranges from 0.2 to 1.0.
4
The results in Exhibit 2 show that under most plausible tax parameters, S corporations will be more valuable than C corporations. This is not surprising since the difference in value represents the present value of tax differentials between the two corporate forms. Because under most tax regimes, the net taxes paid by S corporations are less than those paid by C corporations (see Exhibit 1), S corporations should be valued at a premium. Exhibit 2 shows that under certain conditions this premium is quite substantial.
Exhibit 2 shows that the premium for S corporations is increasing in the dividend payout and in the marginal corporate tax rate and decreasing in the marginal personal tax rate. Intuitively, as the dividend payout increases, the extent of double taxation increases for the C corporation. At one extreme, if the company retains all of its earnings, these earnings are taxed only at the corporate level (assuming indefinite deferral of capital gains taxes.) If dividends are paid, earnings are taxed at the corporate level, then dividends are taxed at the personal level. As corporate taxes increase, any effects of double taxation are magnified and the premium for S corporations increases. Finally, as the the marginal rate on personal income increases, the benefit of deferring taxes through capital gains in the C corporation increases. Hence, the premium for S corporations falls.
The shaded region of Exhibit 2 reports the S corporation premium for the current top statutory tax rates on corporate income (35%) and personal income (39.6%). The premium ranges from 0.07 for a low dividend payout (d=0.2) to 0.54 for the highest possible dividend payout (d=1). Under the current statutory rates, values of d less than 0.07 are not meaningful, because they produce negative values for the S corporation. However, it can be shown that for values of d between 0.07 and 0.18, S corporations are valued at a discount relative to C corporations.
III. Evidence From the Relative Valuation of Master Limited Partnerships
Our findings in the previous section indicate that under current statutory tax rates and under a wide range of payout policies, the value of a S corporation will be higher than the value of an otherwise identical C corporation. This implies that when attempting to value a privately held S corporation using publicly traded C corporations as a benchmark, the appropriate technique would involve applying a premium to reflect the value of the differential taxes paid by the two organizational forms.
There are two potential caveats with this prescription, however. First, recall that the analysis in Section II assumes the indefinite deferral of capital gains, resulting in a marginal tax rate on capital gains income of zero. In practice, this is not likely to be true, resulting in a larger premium for S corporations. Second, the use of publicly traded C corporations as a benchmark assumes implicitly that the marginal investors of the C corporation and S corporation have equal tax rates. To the extent that the marginal investor of the C corporation has a lower personal tax rate, the premium for S corporations will be lower.
5
Although it is not possible to directly observe tax rates of marginal investors, the existence of master limited partnerships (MLPs) offer the opportunity to corroborate our findings from Section II with empirical evidence on the relative valuation of taxable and passthrough entities. MLPs are partnerships in which limited partners contribute capital, but do not participate in the management of the partnership. The limited partners' liability for partnership debts is limited to the amount of capital that they invest. General partners, on the other hand, manage the partnership and ordinarily have unlimited liability for the partnership's debts. To provide limited liability to the general partners, the general partners are sometimes organized as a corporation. As noted in Scholes et al. (2001) , MLPs were commonly used as tax shelters in the 1970s and early 1980s by wealthy individuals who contributed capital as limited partners to fund investment activities, such as research and development or oil and gas exploration, which gave rise to losses in the first few years of operation. These losses could be used by the limited partners to offset the limited partners' other income. Thus, MLPs were essentially publicly traded pass-through entities. Following the 1986 Tax Act, this pass-through status was limited since the Act curtailed the ability of limited partners to realize such losses. 
Exhibit 2. PLEASE ADD TITLE HERE
The exhibit shows the differences in value between S corporations and otherwise identical C corporations. The valuation model assumes that earnings grow at an annual rate of g into perpetuity. Each company retains an identical amount of its earnings equal to (1-d)(1-t c )EBT each year and invests this amount back into its primary businesses. The exhibit reports the difference in value between a S corporation and a C corporation expressed as a fraction of the C corporation's value. Specifically:
Differences in value are reported for different values for marginal corporate tax rate t c , the marginal personal tax rate t p , and the payout rate d. The shaded region denotes current marginal tax rates.
Note: N.M. denotes not meaningful, because the implied value for a S corporation would be negative under the assumed tax and payout parameters.
To assess the relative valuation of taxable and passthrough entities, we compare the valuation of MLPs with their publicly traded industry peers.
6 Specifically, we search the Dow Jones News Retrieval for articles related to MLPs in the two years prior to the 1986 Tax Act (i.e., the period during which MLPs enjoyed complete pass-through status). From the articles, we identify an initial sample of MLPs. Then, we restrict the sample to those firms with financial data on Compustat.
Our final sample contains twelve MLPs in 1984 and fourteen in 1985. The Appendix lists the sample MLPs and their respective industries. Not surprisingly the sample MLPs are concentrated in the oil and gas exploration industry. We employ two commonly used valuation ratios: 1) the market value of invested capital to sales (MVIC/Sales) and 2) the market value of invested capital to the book value of total assets (MVIC/TA). 7 The market value of invested capital is equal to the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity.
Exhibit 3 reports the ratio of the valuation ratio of the sample MLPs to the valuation ratio of the median taxable corporation operating in the same 4-digit SIC industry. The ratios in Exhibit 3 can thus be interpreted as one plus the percentage difference in value between the MLPs and their taxable industry peers. We report mean and median values, but focus our discussion of the results on the medians due to the influence of outlier observations on mean values.
The results in Exhibit 3 show that in 1984 and 1985, MLPs were generally valued at a premium to their industry peers. With the exception of the ratio of MVIC/ Sales in 1984, the median ratio of MLP value to that of the median industry firm exceeds one for all valuation ratios. The valuation premium ranges from 12% to 24%. Average premiums are all positive and are much larger due to the influence of outliers.
One might argue that the differences in valuation ratios between MLPs and their industry peers are driven by some factor other than differential taxes. To explore this possibility, we collect an additional sample 6 An alternative approach is to measure the stock price reaction to the announcement of a conversion from C corporation status to MLP status. Examples of this approach are Christensen and Christensen (1991) , Denning and Shastri (1993) , and Moore, Christensen, and Roenfeldt (1989) . These studies document a positive stock price reaction to the announcement of conversion and interpret the reaction as evidence that the MLP enhances shareholder wealth by eliminating a layer of taxation. Although this interpretation is consistent with our analysis, the event study approach is of limited value in estimating the magnitude of the premium associated with pass-through status. Companies electing to convert to MLP status are presumably those for which there is a benefit to conversion. Because the market anticipates conversion in these cases, the stock price reaction will reflect only the resolution of uncertainty regarding whether or not the company will convert. As such, the stock price reaction most likely understates the tax benefits of pass-through status. 7 We also examined, but do not report, the ratio of market value of invested capital to operating assets and the market value of invested capital to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). Operating assets are missing on Compustat for a large number of our sample companies. In addition, very low and negative values for EBITDA make the interpretation of MVIC/EBITDA problematic. 
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Exhibit 3. PLEASE ADD TITLE HERE
The exhibit displays the ratio of the value of a master limited partnership (MLP) to the median value of taxable corporations operating in the same 4-digit SIC industry. Value is measured using two commonly employed valuation ratios: 1) the market value of invested capital to sales (MVIC/Sales) and 2) the market value of invested capital to the book value of total assets (MVIC/TA). The sample includes 12 MLPs in 1984 and 14 MLPs in 1985. For purposes of comparison, we also report relative valuation ratios for a sample of 15 MLPs in 1995, during which MLPs did not enjoy the same tax advantages. The last two rows of the exhibit measure the difference in median relative valuation ratios between the years in which MLPs enjoyed favorable tax status (1984 and 1985) and the sample year in which they did not (1995).
of 15 MLPs in 1995. As noted earlier, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated many of the tax advantages of MLPs. We choose 1995 to ensure that we not only have a year that post-dates the 1986 Act, but also a year that is long enough after the Act to eliminate the possibility that some MLP's pass-through status had been "grandfathered." If differences in valuation between MLPs and taxable corporations are due to factors other than differential taxation, we should observe valuation premiums in the 1995 sample that are similar to those observed in 1984 and 1985. The results in Exhibit 3 suggest that this is not the case. Valuation premiums are generally larger in 1984 and 1985, the years in which MLPs enjoyed favorable tax status. The last two rows of Exhibit 3 report the difference in median valuation ratios between the 1984/ 1985 samples and the 1995 sample. These results provide our best estimate of the valuation premium that is due to differences in taxation. These results show that the premium ranges from 0.12 to 0.43, depending on the valuation ratio.
Thus, our empirical evidence from MLPs corroborates our simulation evidence from Exhibit 2. Both the simulations and the data point to a valuation premium for pass-through entities that reflects the lower taxes paid by these firms.
IV. The Acquisition of S Corporations
One final consideration is the permanence of the S corporation's pass-through status. One might argue that a S corporation's market value reflects its value to a potential acquirer. Even if there is a net tax advantage to a S corporation, an acquirer will not pay a premium for the S corporation unless the acquirer can receive the same tax advantages following the acquisition. In this section, we briefly discuss the tax implications of the acquisition of an equity interest in a S corporation. 8 We consider three cases: 1) the acquisition of a minority interest in a S corporation, 2) the taxable acquisition of a S corporation, and 3) the tax-free acquisition of a S corporation.
Case 1: Purchase of a Minority Interest
If a taxable C corporation purchases a minority interest in a S corporation, tax consolidation is not permitted. Consequently, the S corporation retains its pass-through status and, hence, its valuation premium relative to an otherwise comparable C corporation.
Case 2: The Taxable Acquisition of a S Corporation
If a C corporation acquires a S corporation, the S coporation's pass-through status is revoked. The S corporation becomes a subsidiary of the C corporation and its income is consolidated with that of the C corporation for tax purposes. However, the taxable acquisition of a S corporation offers potential tax advantages relative to the taxable acquisition of a C corporation. Under section 338 of the Tax Code, the acquiring company can elect to write up the tax basis of the target company's assets. Although this writeup produces larger future tax reductions from depreciation, the amount of the write-up is immediately taxable. Thus, if the target is a taxable corporation, there is no net advantage to such a write-up. Because the S corporation is not taxable at the corporate level, it avoids the tax on the write-up of the assets, but the acquirer still retains the benefit of larger future depreciation tax deductions. Hence, the acquirer will be willing to pay more in a taxable acqusition of a S corporation than they would pay if they were acquiring an otherwise identical C corporation.
Case 3: The Tax-Free Acquisition of a S Corporation
As noted above, the acquisition of a S corporation causes the company's pass-through status to be revoked. The S corporation becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of the C corporation and its income is consolidated with that of the C corporation. Any income earned by the S corporation is passed through to the C corporation where it is taxed at the C corporation's marginal corporate tax rate. If the acquisition is structured as a tax-free acquisition, there is no write-up of the tax basis of the target's assets. Hence, the net tax advantage of the S corporation is eliminated.
Because the net tax advantage of the S corporation is eliminated in a tax-free acquisition, one might argue that the acquisition value of the S corporation is equal to the acquisition value of an otherwise identical C corporation. However, this argument assumes that the shareholders of the S corporation would be willing to sell at such a price. This assumption is incorrect if there is a net tax advantage to S corporation status. As we show in Section II, a net tax advantage leads to S corporations being valued at a premium to otherwise identical C corporations. This premium will be a lower bound on the premium that must be offered to S corporation shareholders in order to induce them to sell their shares to a C corporation in an acquisition. Put differently, the value for the S corporation at which an exchange would take place between a willing buyer and a willing seller would have to be at least as high as the value of the S corporation as an independent going concern.
In sum, although acquisitions can cause a S corporation to lose its pass-through status, the fair market value of a S corporation will still exceed that of an otherwise comparable C corporation. The acquisition of a minority interest does not change the S corporation's pass through status, while the taxable acquisition of the S corporation still produces tax benefits from the election of a write-up in the tax basis of the target's assets. A tax-free acquisition of a S corporation causes its pass-through status to be revoked. However, S corporation shareholders will sell their shares only if they receive a premium compensation for the lost tax advantage. The empirical evidences provided by Erickson and Wong (2002) is consistent with our predictions. They examine purchase price multiples in a sample of taxable stock acquisitions of S corporations to purchase price multiples of a matched set of taxable stock acquisitions of privately held C corporations and find that the S corporations fetch a 10-20% price premium.
V. Summary and Conclusion
In this article, we quantify the net tax advantage of S corporations relative to taxable C corporations. Our analysis indicates that the net tax advantage is economically important; it varies directly with the company's payout ratio, the marginal corporate tax rate, and the capital gains rate of the marginal investor; and it varies inversely with the personal tax rate of the marginal investor.
The analysis predicts that the fair market value of a S corporation will exceed that of an otherwise identical C corporation. We argue that this prediction will hold even in the case of an acquisition of a S corporation. Consistent with our predictions, we find that publicly traded master limited partnerships, which enjoyed net tax advantages in the early 1980s, were valued at a premium relative to taxable corporations operating in the same industry. The fact that this premium is substantially higher prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated the tax advantages of MLPs, supports the view that the premium is due to a tax differential.
Thus, our analysis implies that when valuing a S corporation using a comparable C corporation as a benchmark, the appropriate method involves adding a premium to the C corporation's value to reflect the net tax advantage of pass-through status. It is important to point out in closing, however, that our numerical estimates of the S corporation premium likely represent an upper bound on the S corporation's fair market value premium. S corporations are typically private firms. The lack of marketability in a company's shares results in a valuation discount relative to an otherwise identical publicly traded corporation. 9 This discount for illiquidity can offset the net tax advantage premium of the S corporation.n
